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COMMENTS
REGULATORY TAKINGS: THE SEARCH FOR A
DEFINITIVE STANDARD
Page Carroccia Dringman
Freedom and property rights are inseparable, you cannot have
one without the other.
George Washington
I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas of property law engender as much confusion and
controversy as takings law.' Takings jurisprudence involves the at-
tempts of courts and legislatures to reconcile the competing inter-
ests of individual property rights and government police powers.
Both the United States and Montana Constitutions contain Tak-
ings Clauses which essentially state that private property cannot
be taken for the benefit of the public unless compensation is paid.2
Despite the constitutions' seemingly straightforward language,
courts have been unable to formulate fundamental principles to
govern takings cases. Statements by the United States Supreme
Court that Takings Clause analysis is admittedly "ad hoc" and in-
consistent illustrate this difficulty.3 However, the Supreme Court
has, in part, identified factors that provide a clear standard for
takings analysis.4 Courts must definitively determine and consist-
1. "'Taking' is a term of art with respect to the constitutional right to just compensa-
tion and does not necessarily mean the actual and total conversion of the property." See
David A. Goldman, Inverse Condemnation: A Remedy for Unreasonable Zoning of Prop-
erty, 70 MICH. B.J. 313, 315 (1991).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Montana Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 29 (emphasis added). This language was actually adopted from the Illinois constitu-
tion. PHILIP NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.26 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d rev.
ed. 1993).
3. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 328-35 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 54-76.
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ently apply these factors as part of a coherent takings analysis.
Until state and federal courts clearly define and rigorously ap-
ply takings guidelines, conflicts between property owners and gov-
ernment entities will continue to mount.5 Increased land-use regu-
lations, a result of a growing population and increasing
environmental activity, contribute to the conflict between property
owners and government entities.' Many of these land-use regula-
tions constrain private use and diminish private ownership of
property.
The direction of state land-use regulation is important be-
cause the United States Supreme Court recently stated that the
Court will look toward state law for the protection of property
owners' rights.7 Montana courts and the Montana Legislature
should clarify the protection of property owners' rights. In fact,
many states now are heightening their focus on individual rights,
including property owners' rights.8 Montana, among other states,
has unique language in its Takings Clause that conceivably gives
greater protection to the rights of property owners than does the
federal constitution.'
This Comment explores and compares the relationship be-
tween Montana and federal takings law and proposes that Mon-
tana adopt a stricter takings standard. The proposed standard is
based on a compilation of recent United States 0 and Montana Su-
5. In early 1993, approximately 120 to 150 takings cases were pending before the
United States Court of Federal Claims, compared to 52 in 1991. Florence Williams, Land-
owners Turn the Fifth into Sharp-pointed Sword, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 8, 1993, at 11.
6. "In 1990 alone, the federal government issued more than 63,000 pages of new, re-
vised, and proposed administrative regulations." Mark L. Pollot, The Forgotten Civil Right,
STEWARDS OF THE RANGE, Jan. 1993, at 4. This figure does not take into account state and
local ordinances and regulations. Id.
7. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). In the
discussion of property rights, people often forget that the takings issue actually involves a
constitutionally guaranteed individual liberty.
8. This state movement is referred to as "New Federalism." See generally Foster A.
Stewart, Jr., Comment, The Role of New Federalism in Pennsylvania: Does United States
Supreme Court Precedent Have Any Weight?, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 707 (1992); Marshall J. Tin-
kle, Forward into the Past: State Constitutions and Retroactive Laws, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1253 (1992).
9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Seventeen of 50 state constitutions con-
tain Takings Clauses that are more restrictive (and thus, more protective of property rights)
than the federal Takings Clause. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17;
ARK.' CONST. art. II, § 22; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. art. I., § P, cl. I; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17;
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 24; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 9.
10. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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preme Court decisions,1" the Montana Constitution,12 and state
and federal legislation.'3 This Comment is divided into five parts.
Part II provides an historical background of the federal Takings
Clause and federal takings law. Part III discusses how Montana
courts have interpreted the federal and Montana Takings Clauses
and illustrates the difficulties raised by the lack of a definitive
standard. Part IV suggests that a logical three-part standard de-
rives from takings cases, as evidenced by the recent United States
Supreme Court case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 4
The development of a coherent federal takings analysis likely will
not occur in the near future. Part V, therefore, looks at state ef-
forts to increase the protection of property owners' rights through
existing doctrines, state constitutional clauses, and legislation. This
Comment concludes by suggesting that Montana employ similar
efforts to develop concise takings guidelines that protect and clar-
ify the rights of property owners.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAUSE AND FEDERAL
TAKINGS LAW
The original intent of the Framers of the United States Con-
stitution when drafting the Takings Clause remains elusive.'6
Courts frequently fail to address the original meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause and the principles that should govern its interpreta-
tion. A brief review of the history of the Takings Clause and the
United States Supreme Court's application of the clause supports
this contention.
11. See, e.g., McElwain v. County of Flathead, 248 Mont. 231, 811 P.2d 1267 (1991);
Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 227 Mont. 74, 737 P.2d 478 (1987); Knight v. City of
Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982).
12. MONT. CONST, art II, § 29.
13. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,360, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988); proposed H.B. 570, 53d Mont. Leg. (1993).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2886.
15. Compare Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627-29
(1988) (arguing that classical notions of property are tokens or formalities that cannot be
reconciled with dynamic, modern notions of property) with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 108-12 (1985) (arguing that the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the public use requirement in takings law
negates one of the key structural requirements envisioned in the Takings Clause) and Doug-
las W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause is Neither Weak nor
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1630, 1666 (1988) (disputing Michelman's reasoning and arguing
that the fact that the Takings Clause does not "supply a remedy for every legislative redefi-
nition of property hardly can be seen as a constitutional failure").
1994]
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A. The Federal Takings Clause
Property rights historically have been accorded great protec-
tion and have been a cornerstone in the development of this na-
tion.16 The 'traditional principle at common law was that one could
freely enjoy one's property unless the use injured or damaged one's
neighbor. Blackstone defined an individual's property right as in-
cluding "the free use, enjoyment and disposition of all his acquisi-
tions without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of
the land. 17
The Framers incorporated common law, the English doctrine
of eminent domain," and their fears of a strong central govern-
ment 9 in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Even before the Constitution, American government promoted
natural rights, limitations on government, and an inherent right to
due process and compensation.2 e James Madison incorporated
these concepts into the Constitution when drafting the Takings
Clause. However, Madison also incorporated Blackstone's defini-
tion of an individual's property right and specifically excluded uses
16. See Senator Steve Symms, THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT (1991) (on file with
author).
A second [fallacy] is "human rights, not property rights." Are these rights in any
way inconsistent or mutually destructive? Is not the right to have and be pro-
tected in property a valuable "human right"? Are not those rights mutually con-
sistent and even dependent? Any thoughtful observation of history will reveal
that, where private property rights have not been respected and protected, there
has not been what we call "human rights." Private-property rights are the soil in
which our concept of human rights grows and matures. As long as private-prop-
erty rights are secure, human rights will be respected and will endure and evolve.
Id. at 12 (citing JUSTICE CHARLES E. WHITTAKER, RETURN TO LAW, OR FACE ANARCHY (1966)).
"Next to the right of liberty, the right of property is the most important individual
right guaranteed by the Constitution and the one which, united with that of personal lib-
erty, has contributed more to the growth of civilization than any other institution estab-
lished by the human race." Id. at 11 (citing William H. Taft, 27th President of the United
States (1906)).
"That government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the rights of property are
left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body without any restraint." Id. at 12
(citing Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.)).
"The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the
laws of God, and there is not force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and
tyranny commence." Id. at 11 (citing John Adams, 2d President of the United States
(1821)).
17. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
18. "Eminent domain" is the power of the state to take private property for certain
limited public purposes provided, however, that the property owner receives compensation.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
20. See MARK L. POLLoT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 33-42 (1993) (giving examples).
4
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of property that harmed others. 21 Thus, Madison's original bill of
rights recognized the concept of eminent domain and its limita-
tions. 2  Eighty years later, the drafter of section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, John Bingham, reflected the prevalent view of
the times:
[T]he absolute equality of all, and the equal protection of each,
are principles of our Constitution .... It protects not only life and
liberty, but also property, the product of labor. It contemplates
that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil
any more than of his life.
2 8
Historical precedent supports the argument that the Framers
had great regard for individual property rights and sought to pro-
tect those rights when drafting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. However, the Framers obviously could not address all the
specific questions and issues that would result from varying inter-
pretations of the Takings Clause. Courts were left to resolve those
questions.
B. Federal Takings Law
Under the aegis of police power, the government may regulate
its people's. property for the protection of the public's health,
safety, and welfare. 24 If regulations are so restrictive as to consti-
tute a "taking," the property owner may bring suit under the the-
ory of inverse condemnation.2 5 Inverse condemnation is a taking of
private property for a public use without the commencement of a
condemnation proceeding, but title does not pass to the govern-
ment.26 When analyzing inverse condemnation cases, courts use a
21. Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 JAMES MADISON, THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (1983). The exclusion of the use of property that harmed
others is the precursor of the nuisance exception in takings law.
22. "No person shall be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36.
23. POLLOT, supra note 20, at 48 (citation omitted).
24. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); accord Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 411 (1915).
25. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (defining inverse condemna-
tion as "a 'cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property
which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency' ") (quoting
D. Hagman, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)). The Court
in Clarke went on to state that: "A landowner is entitled to bring such an action as a result
of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensa-
tion.'" Id. (citation omitted).
19941
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two-pronged takings analysis: (1) whether government regulation
exceeds police power limitations and (2) whether the regulation,
even if a valid exercise of police power, constitutes a taking.27
Courts, however, have been unable to develop consistent tests to
address this analysis.
This two-pronged takings analysis stems from a confusing and
complex background of federal takings law. Although the notion of
eminent domain pre-dates the United States Constitution,28 tak-
ings law actually evolved from due process and natural law.29
While pre-1920 cases discussed the taking of private property, they
did so in light of due process and natural law theories.30
The late 1800s saw the gradual decline of the protection of
property rights. The courts began to shift their focus from individ-
ual rights to states' rights which contributed to the confusion over
takings law."1 Until 1872, the courts extended significant protec-
tion to property rights and distrusted legislative power.32 As the
United States Supreme Court observed in Wilkinson v. Leland:
[F]undamental maxims of a free government seem to require,
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be
warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard
them; a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice
and civil liberty; lurked under any general grant of legislative au-
thority, or ought to be implied from any general expression of the
will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part
with rights so vital to their security and well being.33
Beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases, in 1872, the judi-
27. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61.
28. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15 (discussing the development of eminent domain).
29. If early cases considered the Takings Clause, courts considered it as an aspect of
English concepts of due process and natural law. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
Of course, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states until December 15, 1791. See
U.S. GOV'T. PRINTING OFFICE, COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION 22 n.*.
30. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798); Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 118a (1610). Significant protection continued to
be given property rights until the era of substantive due process. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
32. See, e.g., Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 624 (1869) (stating that Fifth
Amendment provisions, including the Due Process Clause, operate "directly in limitation
and restraint of the legislative powers conferred by the Constitution"); see also Calder, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 400 (suggesting that the distribution of power among the legislative
branches would prevent majority control).
33. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
250 [Vol. 55
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ciary began to afford substantially less protection to individual
rights, including property rights, in favor of states' rights.3' Al-
though property owners still enjoyed some protection, the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases initiated the era of "substantive due process,"
which in theory gave greater protection to private property. Ulti-
mately, however, the era resulted in the decline of personal prop-
erty rights and the rise of states' rights.3 5
Regulatory takings-inverse condemnation-gained recogni-
tion only after 1920. The application of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, as a fundamental precept governing inverse con-
demnation, dates back to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.36 The
Mahons originally brought suit against Pennsylvania Coal Com-
pany (the Company) to prevent the Company from mining under
the Mahons' property causing the surface of Mahons' land to cave
in.37 The Company originally had deeded the property to the
Mahons but reserved the right to remove the coal.3 The Mahons
argued that the Kohler Act, which purported to protect the lives
and safety of the public by regulating the mining of coal, prohib-
ited the Company from mining under the Mahons' property.3 9 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the Kohler Act was a
valid exercise of police power."0 Justice Holmes, in delivering the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, however, reversed
and held that "the right to coal consists in the right to mine it."''4
The Court found that the Kohler Act made it commercially im-
practical to mine coal, which effectively resulted in the appropria-
tion of private property. 2 The general rule from Mahon states that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' 3
After Mahon, courts have attempted to clarify regulatory tak-
ings by defining regulations that go "too far." The attempt to de-
34. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (upholding an act of the Louisiana Legislature that
granted a 25-year monopoly over the slaughter-house industry to a state-created
corporation).
35. The Slaughter-House Cases marked the beginning of the Lochner era. This era
provided the foundation for a determination of rights, known as "tiering," based upon
whether they were deserving of strict protection (fundamental rights) or only minimum pro-
tection (non-fundamental rights). POLLOT, supra note 20, at 51.
36. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
.38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 414.
42. Id. at 414-15.
43. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
1994]
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fine what is "too far" has led to the second prong of the takings
analysis: Whether the regulation, even if a valid exercise of police
power, constitutes a taking."'
Courts have identified, but inconsistently applied, two tests to
assist in takings analysis: (1) the rational basis (also called means-
ends) test for the first prong of the takings analysis45 and (2) a
multi-factor balancing test for the second prong of the takings
analysis."' These tests derive from United States Supreme Court
decisions, but are haphazardly applied.
1. The Rational Basis Test
The rational basis test arose during the turn of the century,
the era of substantive due process."7 This era provided the founda-
tion for a determination of rights known as "tiering." The rational
basis test requires only that a government regulation reasonably
advance a legitimate state interest."'
44. Id. Mahon is the leading case for this proposition.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 47-60.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 61-70.
47. See Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitu-
tional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (1989);. see also E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear It
for Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV.
355, 361 (1988).
48. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (setting forth a two-pronged test
that a land use regulation effects a taking if it fails to substantially advance a legitimate
state interest or "denies an owner economically viable use of his land"). Note that the Court
used "substantially advance" but merely applied a reasonable or rational basis test. A num-
ber of commentators refer to this test as the "means-ends" test. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note
15. However, all tests are means-ends tests. "Tiering" is a form of definitional balancing
used in constitutional adjudication that "directs a review of government purposes and de-
scribes the corresponding burden of persuasion" for certain rights. David L. Faigman, Rec-
onciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Su-
preme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (1992). Rights at the core of a
constitutional clause require a court to strictly scrutinize the regulation to determine if the
regulation is necessary to accomplish a compelling government interest. Rights at the "pe-
riphery" of a constitutional clause require only that the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. Certain rights that fall between the core and the periphery
of a constitutional clause require an intermediate level of scrutiny: that the regulation sub-
stantially advance an important government interest. Id. at 1522-23. Property rights are
recognized in the Constitution as fundamental rights. Thus, the application of a rational
basis test to property rights is contrary to the tier scheme. Courts, however, consistently
misapply or misconstrue the tier scheme with relation to property rights. See the Montana
Supreme Court's enunciation of a takings test discussed supra at text accompanying note
.146. Although incorrect, the courts' application of this test generally requires a rational ba-
sis for government action; therefore, this Comment refers (unwillingly) to the test as a ra-
tional basis test. In a recent case claiming equal protection under the Fifth Amendment,
Justice Thomas's majority opinion demonstrates just how minimal the requirements are for
the rational basis test: "[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
8
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Consistent with the rise of states' rights, courts almost without
exception have favored governmental regulation over property
rights.' The majority of cases decided under the rational basis test
during this period addressed zoning laws5" and public nuisance
prevention.5 1 Not only were most regulations upheld as a valid ex-
ercise of police power, but the Supreme Court also refused to com-
pensate the landowners.52 In fact, the application of a rational ba-
sis test resulted in a "rubber stamp of approval" for governmental
police power regulations. 3
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 54  signaled the
United States Supreme Court's movement away from a "rubber
stamp" or superficial application of the rational basis test to a
more rigorous standard of review. The Supreme Court made clear
that the mere assertion of a public purpose would not justify a gov-
ernmental taking.5 Rather, the Court closely reviewed both the
means used and whether the regulation bore a substantial relation
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification." FCC v. Beach Comm., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993).
49. See infra notes 50-51 (listing cases where courts failed to uphold the rights of the
property owner).
50. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (governing the distance buildings must
be set back from the streets); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding a zoning law prohibiting industrial use); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)
(upholding a zoning law regarding height restrictions on buildings).
51. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sustaining a law
which effectively prevented the further operation of a gravel mining pit); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928) (sustaining a statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees which
threatened nearby apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibit-
ing the operation of a brickyard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibiting manu-
facture of alcoholic beverages).
52. At least one commentator criticizes the Court's reasoning in applying the rational
basis test to the cases cited supra in nbtes 50-51. In fact, the commentator considers
Hadacheck:
[a classic example] of some of the most violently offensive decisions not to com-
pensate .... It would be no less erratic for society to explain to a homeowner, as it
bulldozed his house out of the way of a new public school or pumping station, that
he should have realized from the beginning that congestion would necessitate
these facilities.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1237, 1242-43 (1967).
53. John Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 1011, 1020 (1983); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
("A legislative enactment] need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."). A
police power statute passes constitutional scrutiny if it has "some fair tendency to accom-
plish, or aid in the accomplishment of some purpose, for which the legislature may use the
power." Welch, 214 U.S. at 105.
54. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
55. Nolan, 483 U.S. at 841.
9
Dringman: Regulatory Takings
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
to a legitimate state interest.56 Moreover, the Court held that a
nexus must exist between the declared governmental purpose and
the regulation's impact upon the individual.
5 7
In holding that the Coastal Commission did not prove the ex-
istence of a nexus between the regulation and a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, the Court demonstrated its willingness to strictly
apply the rational basis test. In Nollan, the Court struck down a
regulation requiring the owner of a lot along the California coast to
grant the public an easement to walk along the shore as a condi-
tion to obtaining a permit to construct a house on the lot.58 Impor-
tant in the Nollan decision was the Court's refusal to uphold the
Coastal Commission's conclusion that the regulation was suffi-
ciently related to its goal of allowing the public easy access to
beaches." This decision marks the first time, in takings law, that
the Court imposed any actual burden of proof on a government
agency. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated "[w]e view
the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a plead-
ing requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exer-
cise in cleverness and imagination. ' ' 10
2. The Multi-factor Balancing Test
The second level of the analysis, the determination of when a
regulation has gone so far that it constitutes a taking, requires a
court to employ the multi-factor balancing test. The multi-factor
balancing test requires that courts evaluate the effect of regula-
tions on private property. Even if a court determines a regulation
to be a valid exercise of police power, the regulation may still re-
sult in a taking of private property. The multi-factor balancing test
derives from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York. 1 In Penn Central, the Court recognized that no set formula
existed for determining when a taking occurred. However, the
Court did identify a number of significant factors, drawn from
56. Id. at 840-41. Note that the Court employed the mid-level tier of constitutional
analysis. See supra text accompanying note 48.
57. Id. at 841 (holding that "[t]he Commission may well be right that [the easement]
is a good idea, but that does not establish that the Nollans (and other coastal residents)
alone can be compelled to contribute to its realization").
58. Id. at 838-41.
59. Id. at 838-39. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall decried the majority's
decision, with Justice Blackmun stating that a "[sitate's exercise of its police power need be
no more than rationally based." Id. at 865.
60. Id. at 841.
61. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Juxtapose the cited language against Justice Thomas' lan-
guage in Beach supra note 48.
[Vol. 55
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other cases.2 The factors include: (1) economic impact of the regu-
lation, (2) character of the government action, (3) investment-
backed expectations, and (4) offsetting reciprocal benefits.6 3 Apply-
ing these factors, the Court sustained New York City's Landmarks
Preservations Law against a takings challenge, and the multi-fac-
tor balancing test became the focus of takings jurisprudence."
A few years later, the Court used the Penn Central multi-fac-
tor balancing test in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,66 a case factually similar to Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon. At issue was whether the Subsidence Act, which prevented
the mining of coal under certain properties, was a legitimate ad-
vancement of the state's interest in protecting the public health,
safety, and welfare."6 In applying Penn Central's balancing factors
and upholding the Act, the Court said that: (a) "the character of
the governmental action . . . leans heavily against finding a tak-
ing," (b) petitioners present no evidence that the regulations
"make[] it impossible . . . to profitably engage in their business,"
and (c) the Act does not result in "undue interference with their
investment-backed expectations. 67 Nevertheless, the Court care-
fully avoided overruling Mahon.6 Instead, the Court found the
Subsidence Act affected only "one strand in the bundle of property
rights" and was narrower in application than the Kohler Act.6 9
The Penn Central factors have been the basis of takings anal-
ysis in other recent Supreme Court cases. 71 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the Court's application of these factors is often quite superfi-
cial.7 ' In fact, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to protect
62. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-28.
63. Id. at 124; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
64. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-38.
65. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
66. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486.
67. Id. at 485.
68. Id. at 484.
69. Id. at 497 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)). See supra text ac-
companying notes 39-42 (discussing the Kohler Act).
70. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979).
71. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Williamson Co.
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191-200 (1985) (declining to
address whether land use regulations constitute a taking even though the jury concluded
that the property owner was denied any economically viable use of his land). But see
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that
physical installation of television cables on an apartment building is a taking because a
permanent physical occupation occurred). See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980) (concluding that a change in a zoning ordinance which prohibited high-density
development and injured property owners' investment-backed expectations by two million
19941 255
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property rights beyond bare physical possession.7 Although often
phrased differently, the factors set forth in Penn Central remain
the principal considerations in regulatory takings analysis.
Even after seventy years of regulatory takings law, cases are
still decided on an ad hoc factual inquiry.73 Although no definitive
standard has emerged, a few rules exist.74 A regulation is not a tak-
ing if the regulation prevents a nuisance or a public danger.75 A
regulation is not a taking unless the regulation (a) requires a physi-
cal invasion or occupation of the property, (b) leaves the owner
with no economically viable use, or (c) entirely divests the owner of
the right to dispose of the owner's property. 76 In most other in-
stances, the courts will employ a Penn Central analysis.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,77 focused renewed attention on the takings law
debate. 78 Since 1987, the Supreme Court has moved toward a re-
turn to a rigorous review of governmental regulation and demon-
dollars did not constitute a taking).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. These rules are derived partially from cases discussed previously. However, at least
two other cases are important for their impact on takings analysis. The Court in Agins v.
City of Tiburon held that a taking occurred only if the regulation did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest or denied an owner economically viable use of his land.
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. This decision contributed to the misconception in California that
"there could be no uncompensated takings, only invalid regulations." See Roger J. Marzulla
& Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court: Adjusting
the Burdens that in Fairness and Equity Ought to be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40
CATH. U. L. REV. 549, 554 (1991).
The Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles expanded
Agins in holding that a valid police power action may substantially advance legitimate state
interests, but if that regulation denies an owner economically viable use of his land, then the
regulation may still be a taking requiring compensation. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315-17 (1987). First English also stands for the pro-
position that a temporary taking may deprive an owner of the use of the owner's land,
thereby requiring compensation. Id. at 322.
75. William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Tak-
ings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1589 (1988).
76. Id.
77. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
78. Although some commentators do not believe that Lucas has significantly clarified
takings law, others believe that Lucas represents a conservative trend becoming more preva-
lent in takings law. Compare Eugene J. Morris, Lucas: Police Power and Land Use Regula-
tion, PROBATE & PROPERTY, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 46, 50 (suggesting that "Lucas does not con-
stitute a major breakthrough in takings law") with POLLOT, supra note 20, at 188-95
(suggesting that Lucas is an extremely important decision, not only for the holding but for
the dicta contained in the opinion). Two significant implications of the dicta in Lucas are:
(1) the idea that less than total deprivation may be compensable, and (2) the idea that a
regulation requiring land to be left in its natural state may be a taking. Although Lucas'
impact remains unknown, both "environmentalists" and "land use planners" have labeled
the decision "radical." See Williams, supra note 5, at 12.
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strated a willingness to shift the burden of proof in the first prong
of the takings analysis to the government. 9 With Lucas, the Court
accentuates the precedential value of both Nollan and Penn
Central.
III. MONTANA TAKINGS LAW
Until recently Montana has analyzed the taking of private
property under either due process or the Takings Clause.80 Like
their federal counterparts, Montana courts seldom resolve claims
brought under due process in favor of the property owner.81 More
recently, federal and Montana courts have used both the rational
basis and multi-factor balancing tests in takings analysis.2 Occa-
sionally, the Montana Supreme Court has recognized the "or dam-
aged" language in Montana's constitution when analyzing takings
cases.
83
A. Due Process
The Montana Supreme Court uses a rational basis test in most
claims brought under the Due Process Clause. 4 Like the United
States Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court has upheld
legislative enactments if any rational basis for them exists. In Bill-
ings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, the court stated that
"[an act of the legislature is presumed to be valid; every intend-
ment is in favor of upholding its constitutionality; it will not be
condemned unless its invalidity is shown beyond a reasonable
doubt. '85 However, in the same case, the court also found that laws
enacted under the guise of police power are subject to review under
both the state and federal constitutions and are "always subject to
judicial scrutiny." '
79. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 84-97.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 113-32.
83. See Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 172, 642 P.2d 141, 145 (1982); Less
v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 32, 72 P. 140, 141 (1903).
84. See, e.g., Yellowstone Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Ostermiller, 187 Mont. 8, 16, 608
P.2d 491, 496 (1980); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 28-33,
394 P.2d 182, 184-87 (1964); Gas Prods. Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 392-95, 207 P. 993,
998-99 (1922).
85. Billings Properties, 144 Mont. at 30, 394 P.2d at 185 (citing Gas Prods. Co., 63
Mont. 372, 207 P. 993).
86. Id. at 31, 394 P.2d at 186 (citations omitted) (holding that a statutory requirement
that a developer dedicate land for a school and park does not contravene the provisions of
art. III, § 14 of the 1889 Montana Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
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When addressing a due process claim brought under the Four-
teenth Amendment in a case more appropriately analyzed as an
easement issue than a takings issue, the Montana Supreme Court,
nevertheless, indicated that the validity of the regulation was de-
terminative. In Yellowstone Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Ostermiller, the Cooperative brought suit alleging that a statute
requiring utilities to raise or remove their transmission lines for
the moving of heavy equipment and oversized loads resulted in a
taking of their property.87 The court held that the statute was a
valid exercise of police power, aimed at protecting the public
health, safety, and welfare, and not a taking in any traditional
sense."" The court further held that when exercising police power,
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements do not require
just compensation. 9
B. The Takings Clause
Although Montana courts engaging in Takings Clause analysis
employ both the rational basis and multi-factor tests of federal
takings law, the distinction between the two tests is not as well-
defined in Montana takings case law. The Montana Constitution's
Takings Clause is more protective of property rights than federal
takings law because of the "or damaged" language.9 0 In cases
where regulation is excessive or an appropriation of property
amounts to a taking or deprivation of property for public use, the
Montana Supreme Court has stated that compensation is due. 1
Claims brought under the Takings Clauses92 alleging inverse
condemnation have more often resulted in favorable decisions for
property owners.9 For example, in 1971 the City of Three Forks
brought an inverse condemnation action against the Highway
Commission alleging that the Highway Commission took property
belonging to the City. 4 The State contended that either the prop-
87. Yellowstone Valley Elec., 187 Mont. at 10, 608 P.2d at 491.
88. Id. at 14, 608 P.2d at 495.
89. Id. at 13, 608 P.2d at 494.
90. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29.
91. See, e.g., Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. V; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29. The plaintiff brings suit under
either or both of these constitutional amendments as opposed to a due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., City of Three Forks v. Montana State Hwy. Comm'n,
156 Mont. 392, 480 P.2d 826 (1971).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 94-112.
94. City of Three Forks, 156 Mont. 392, 480 P.2d 826. Three Forks had slated the
property for a sewage disposal site, and the Highway Commission appropriated the land for
the construction of an interstate highway. The construction of the highway resulted in the
taking of 2.05 acres of a 2.66-acre site. Id. at 393-94, 480 P.2d at 827.
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erty was public property and therefore no compensation was re-
quired or, alternatively, that the State's action sounded in eminent
domain, and the City was only entitled to the fair market value of
the acreage.9
The court held that Article III, Section 14 of the Montana
Constitution applied because the City of Three Forks and its citi-
zens owned the land, not the State of Montana or the federal gov-
ernment. 6 Further, in discussing whether the State's action
sounded in eminent domain, the court held:
When the State takes private property for a public use without
just compensation having first been paid, the State has exercised
its governmental power without proceeding in accordance with
the procedure required by law. "The effect of (Article III, § 14) is
to waive immunity of the state where private property is taken or
damaged for public purposes." '97
1. "Or Damaged" Language
Montana's Takings Clause differs from the Takings Clause in
the United States Constitution. The Montana Constitution pro-
vides that property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation. 8
Although the United States Supreme Court still struggles with
the theory of inverse condemnation without physical invasion of
the property or total elimination of its economic value, Montana
courts recognized that such a claim could be brought as early as
1903.11 In Less v. City of Butte, the Montana Supreme Court rec-
ognized the significance of the words "or damaged" in the Mon-
tana Constitution0 ° and held:
[T]his section was drafted in the broad language stated for the
express purpose of preventing an unjust or arbitrary exercise of
the power of eminent domain .... Constitutions which provide
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation" are but declaratory of the common law....
Under constitutions which provide that property shall not be
95. Id. at 395-98, 480 P.2d at 828-29. The State assessed the value at $532, while the
mayor of the City testified that the value of the land was $85,000-the value the land had as
a sewage plant. Id. at 394, 480 P.2d at 827.
96. Id. at 395-96, 480 P.2d at 828.
97. Id. at 399, 480 P.2d at 830 (citing 3 NICHOLS' ON EMINENT DOMAIN 11, n.15.1).
Eminent domain is a subset of, and one of the foundations for, takings law. See supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text.
98. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29 (emphasis added).
99. See Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903).
100. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29.
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"taken or damaged" it is universally held that "it is not necessary
that there be any physical invasion of the individual's property
for public use to entitle him to compensation. '"101
While no federal court has explicitly held that a partial (not
temporary) loss in value is compensable, the Montana Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed the Less opinion. 02 Knight v. City of
Billings stands for the proposition that the court will compensate
for a partial loss in value. 103 The Knights represented a group of
property owners whose properties were subject to a zoning ordi-
nance classifying their properties as residential. 0 4 After the City
condemned property on the east side of the street to add a fifth
lane and other improvements, the Knights petitioned the City
council for a zoning change which would enable plaintiffs' proper-
ties to be classified "residential professional.' 1 5 When the City de-
nied their petition, the Knights brought suit alleging inverse con-
demnation of their properties. 06
The City claimed that it was adapting to growth in making the
improvements, and, therefore, it acted within its police power. 10
The district court found for the City and agreed that the ordinance
and the denial of rezoning were valid exercises of police power.10 8
The Montana Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court,
holding that even a valid exercise of police power is not a complete
defense to an inverse condemnation suit. 0 9 Furthermore, the court
held that although no physical taking had occurred, the Knights
and other plaintiffs suffered a twenty to thirty percent reduction in
their property values, and "the result of the City's action had been
to impose a servitude, a limitation upon the use and marketability
101. Less, 28 Mont. at 31-32, 72 P. at 141 (citation omitted).
102. Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 172-73, 642 P.2d 141, 145 (1982).
103. Id. at 173-74, 642 P.2d at 145-46.
104. Id. at 166-67, 642 P.2d at 141-42.
105. Id. at 168, 642 P.2d at 142.
106. Id. at 168, 642 P.2d at 143. The plaintiffs' houses were no longer suitable for
residential use because they had no free access into driveways, traffic accidents had occurred
upon their properties, the sidewalks and front yards were not safe for children and pets,
traffic noise was loud all night long, and the houses could not be ventilated from the east
side because of dust and exhaust fumes. Id. at 169, 642 P.2d at 143.
107. Id. at 170, 642 P.2d at 144.
108. Id. at 170, 642 P.2d at 143.
109. Id. at 171, 642 P.2d at 144-45 (adopting the rule from Mattoon v. City of Nor-
man, 617 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1980), where an Oklahoma court said: "The defendant claims
that the ordinance is a valid exercise of its police powers through zoning and cannot consti-
tute a governmental 'taking' of property. This is not the law in Oklahoma. We have never
held that a finding that the exercise of police power is valid absolutely precludes compensa-
tion for property taken or damaged by such exercise.").
[Vol. 55260
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of plaintiffs' properties as residential. '" 110
In Knight, the Montana Supreme Court recognized that the
theory of inverse condemnation could apply to a partial taking
based upon the "or damaged" language of Montana's Constitution.
The court cited Less v. City of Butte for the proposition that con-
stitutional tests may differ depending upon whether the words
"private property shall not be taken or damaged" or "private
property shall not be taken" appear."1 The court further recog-
nized the limits on governmental power, stating:
It is a universal principle that wherever an individual's right of
ownership of property is recognized in a free government, other
rights become worthless if the government possesses uncontrolla-
ble power over the property of the individual. The constitutional
guaranty of the right to own and use property is unquestioned.
Thus the claim that particular action is taken under the police
power cannot justify disregard of constitutional inhibitions.112
Although the court infrequently invokes the "or damaged"
language, this particular language could play a role in formulating
a state interpretation of takings law. The Montana Supreme Court,
however, has applied the "or damaged" language inconsistently,
apparently preferring to concentrate its takings analysis on federal
tests.
2. Multi-Factor and Rational Basis Test
Montana courts have experienced no more success than fed-
eral courts at formulating a definitive takings standard. However,
in 1987 the Montana Supreme Court addressed the takings analy-
sis in Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co. by combining both
the rational basis test and the multi-factor balancing test.1 Al-
though this case was decided immediately after the United States
Supreme Court decision, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,14 the Montana Supreme Court found Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon to control.'1 "
The regulation at issue in Western Energy was a statutory
owner consent provision requiring the owner of the surface lands
to consent to the entry onto the property and commencement of
110. Id. at 173, 642 P.2d at 145.
111. Id. at 172-73, 642 P.2d at 145.
112. Id. at 172, 642 P.2d at 144 (quoting Mattoon, 617 P.2d at 1349).
113. 227 Mont. 74, 737 P.2d 478 (1987).
114. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
115. Western Energy, 227 Mont. at 79, 737 P.2d at 481. Keystone and Mahon are
factually similar yet the holdings are contrary.
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strip mining operations by the owner of the mineral estate. 16
Western Energy was the owner of the mineral rights, and Genie
Land owned the surface rights. Genie Land denied Western En-
ergy the right to enter the land, thus preventing Western from ob-
taining a permit to mine. Western Energy brought suit requesting
that Genie Land and the Department of State Lands be enjoined
from denying Western Energy the right to obtain a coal strip-min-
ing permit and the right to enter lands to strip mine coal without
further consent or waiver. 1 7 Further, Western Energy requested
that the court declare the owner consent provision
unconstitutional."
8
First, the Montana Supreme Court questioned the validity of
the regulation under the rational basis test. In analyzing this case,
the court cited the prohibitions of both the Montana and United
States Constitutions on the taking of property without due pro-
cess." 9 The court also said that "a police power regulation must
injure or impair property rights only to the extent reasonably nec-
essary to preserve the public welfare."" 20
In applying the rational basis test, the court found that the
owner consent statute did not bear a "substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 2 The court said
that the statute did not address any policy goal, did not prevent
strip-mining operations, did not regulate reclamation, and did not
conserve agricultural land.' 22 In short, the statute accomplished
none of the goals supposedly necessary for preservation of the pub-
lic welfare.
Second, the court applied part of the multi-factor balancing
test to determine if a taking occurred. The court focused on the
character of the action and the extent of interference with the
116. Id. at 75-76, 737 P.2d at 479-80; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-224 (1991)
(repealed 1993).
117. Western Energy, 227 Mont. at 75, 737 P.2d at 479.
118. Id. at 77, 737 P.2d at 480.
119. Id. In Western Energy the court looked at the following constitutional provi-
sions: U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29: "Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full extent of the
loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner." Id.
120. Western Energy, 227 Mont. at 78, 737 P.2d at 481 (citing its adoption of the
rational basis test from Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
121. Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
122. Id. at 79, 737 P.2d at 481 (finding, at most, a limited public interest protected by
the statute).
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rights in the entire property.12 Comparing Western Energy to
Mahon, the court found that the owner consent provision, like the
Kohler Act, deprived Western Energy of the right to mine coal. 124
Although Genie Land contended that Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis controlled, 12 5 the court distinguished
Keystone on three grounds. First, Keystone found that coal min-
ing, in certain circumstances, constituted a public nuisance.12 6 Yet,
Montana does not characterize strip mining as a nuisance. 27 Sec-
ond, Keystone's Subsidence Act applied to all minerals whether or
not they had been severed from the surface estate. 28 Montana's
owner consent provision, however, applied only to severed mineral
rights.'29 Finally, the plaintiffs in Keystone tried to define certain
segments of their property and argued that the Subsidence Act ap-
propriated coal in those segments."' In Keystone, the United
States Supreme Court held that the coal required to be left in
place by the Subsidence Act was simply one strand in petitioners'
bundle of rights. 31 Conversely, the Montana court refused to di-
vide an individual's property rights into segments for the purpose
of determining whether a government action effected a taking. 3
The Montana Supreme Court recognizes the same general tak-
ings rules as the United States Supreme Court. 33 Yet, the deci-
sions in Knight and Western Energy indicate that the court would
be more willing than the United States Supreme Court to declare
regulations invalid or award compensation if a regulation should go
"too far." Therefore, the 1991 decision in McElwain v. County of
123. Id. at 81, 737 P.2d at 483 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
124. Id. at 79, 737 P.2d at 482. "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it
can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has
very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
125. Western Energy, 227 Mont. at 80, 737 P.2d at 482.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 81, 737 P.2d at 482-83.
129. Id. at 81, 737 P.2d at 482.
130. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496.
131. Id. at 497 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)) (holding that where
an owner possesses a full bundle of property rights, the destruction of one strand of the
bundle is not a taking).
132. See Western Energy, 227 Mont. 74, 737 P.2d 478. The author agrees with one
commentator who identifies this as the primary question in takings jurisprudence: "Is prop-
erty severable for the purposes of takings jurisprudence as it is in real life?" James L.
Huffman, A Colloquium on Lucas: Lucas: A Small Step in the Right Direction, 23 ENVTL.
L. REV. 901 (1993).
133. See the United States Supreme Court's takings rules at supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying notes.
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Flathead"" was especially surprising because the court ignored its
own prior decisions as well as recent federal precedent.
In 1979 Mary McElwain purchased fourteen acres along the
Flathead River for the purpose of building a home in which to re-
tire. ' Mrs. McElwain purchased property free and clear of restric-
tions which would have prevented its use for residential purposes.
At the time of purchase, however, the property was subject to 1975
sanitation regulations requiring a 100-foot setback from the Flat-
head River, with no mention of a setback requirement from the
100-year floodplain. 13  Neither Flathead County regulations nor
state regulations would have prevented Mrs. McElwain from build-
ing her home on the site as originally contemplated.13 7
Flathead County then subjected Mrs. McElwain's property to
a restriction which significantly impaired or eliminated the parcel's
value. In 1984 Flathead County adopted the Flathead County
Flood Plain Regulations and Federal Emergency Management
Area (FEMA) flood plain maps.13 8 Later that year, Mrs. McElwain
applied for a permit to install a below-ground septic system to be-
gin construction of her home, but the County denied her permit
claiming that all of her property lay in or within 100 feet of the
100-year floodplain.3 9 The County later determined that her prop-
erty suffered a reduction in value of $50,000. She then reapplied
for the permit with a proposed drain field eighty feet from the
floodplain and requested a twenty-foot variance, which the County
subsequently denied. 40 After appealing the denial of her variance
request through the administrative process, she initiated a suit for
inverse condemnation and requested compensation for a taking of
her property.'4
The district court entered findings of fact that county regula-
tions reduced Mrs. McElwain's market value from $75,000 to
$25,000, yet denied her claim for inverse condemnation. 42 The dis-
134. 248 Mont. 231, 811 P.2d 1267 (1991).
135. McElwain, 248 Mont. at 233, 811 P.2d at 1268.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 233, 811 P.2d at 1269.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 234, 811 P.2d at 1269. The County advised Mrs. McElwain that the only
acceptable proposal, at great cost to her, would be a mounded sewer system. Id.
141. Id.
142. Appellant's Brief at 14, McElwain (No.81-36) (citing District Court Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Nos. 17, 18). Finding of Fact No. 17 states:
Expert testimony revealed that if the imposition of the aforesaid servitude and
limitations upon the Plaintiff's property had not been involved, the highest and
best use of the Plaintiff's property was for use as residential property with a
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trict court held that the regulations served a legitimate state inter-
est, and, therefore, she was not entitled to compensation. 14 Mrs.
McElwain appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rul-
ing. 1 4 The court attempted to justify its claim that "reasonable"
and "substantial" are interchangeable in the first prong of the tak-
ings analysis. 145 The court, however, stated its intention to clarify
the takings standard and enunciated the following test to deter-
mine whether a land use regulation is proper:
[W]hether the regulation is substantially related to the legitimate
State interest of protecting the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the public, and utilizes the least restrictive means nec-
essary to achieve this end without denying the owner economi-
cally viable use of his or her land.146
Although Mrs. McElwain did not contest the validity of the
regulation, the Montana court predicated its decision, in large part,
on the rule that legislative enactments are presumed to be valid. 47
Additionally, the court found the County's testimony sufficient evi-
building site about 150 to 200 feet from the west boundary, utilizing the amenity
of the Flathead River. Said property, free and clear of the servitude and limita-
tions imposed by Flathead County of September 5, 1984, would have a fair market
value of $75,000.00, both at said time and as of the date of May 13, 1988, the date
of final exhaustion of all administrative procedures.
Number 18 states:
The adoption and imposition of the said servitude and limitations upon the Plain-
tiff's property has reduced its fair market value to $25,000.00 because Plaintiff is
not able to utilize the property nor in any fashion take advantage of the amenities
of its location on the shores of the Flathead River, as was her intended use. Thus,
Plaintiff has suffered irreparable damages to her property of a permanent and
irreparable nature.'
143. McElwain, 248 Mont. at 232-33, 811 P.2d at 1268.
144. Id. The court, therefore, ignored its own prior decisions recognizing that a legiti-
mate state interest still can effect a taking.
145. Id. at 234-36, 811 P.2d at 1269-70 (asking whether a land use regulation "sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest"). But see Faigman, supra text accompanying
note 48 (discussing the three-tiered structure of constitutional adjudication).
146. Id. at 235, 811 P.2d at 1270. The court errs in its analysis for two reasons. First,
the court equates reasonable and substantial although the terms imply different levels of
constitutional review based on the right at issue. Second, the court enunciates a new test
that requires the "least restrictive means necessary" although this language implies the
highest level of protection for the right at issue and requires a showing of compelling gov-
ernment interest. The court compounds the confusion over the real meaning of its takings
test by advocating an intermediate level test and then a compelling interest test, but apply-
ing only a rational basis test. Compare Faigman's explanation of "tiering" in supra note 48
with the court's taking test discussed here and the court's summary review of the setback
regulation in McElwain, 248 Mont. at 236-37, 811 P.2d at 1271.
147. Id. This presumption of validity is one Justice Sheehy, dissenting, found to be
baseless judicial deference. Id. at 240, 811 P.2d at 1273.
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dence to find the regulations met the "substantial relation" prong
of the test." 8 Flathead County claimed that the floodplain regula-
tions adopted after Mary McElwain purchased her lot advanced
the legitimate state interest in public health. 49 However, as stated
in Justice Sheehy's dissent, the County could not point to a single
scientific study that supported the setbacks, nor did EPA regula-
tions mention floodplains in their setback requirements. 5 '
Under a rigorous application of the rational basis test, as used
in Western Energy'5' or Nollan,152 the County would have the bur-
den of proving the validity of the setback requirement. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court, then, should have strictly reviewed whether
the setback requirement substantially advanced a legitimate state
interest. The court neither required proof nor questioned the
County's asserted means, instead reverting to "rubber stamp" no-
tions of legitimacy.
Mrs. McElwain did not challenge the validity of the regula-
tion; rather, she claimed that the regulation, even if a valid exer-
cise of police power, still constituted a taking requiring compensa-
tion. "'53  However, the Montana Supreme Court did not
satisfactorily address this question. Instead, the court concentrated
on the validity of the regulation.' 5 ' In fact, the court summarily
reviewed the question of compensation and effectively ignored
cases recognizing that a valid regulation may still constitute a tak-
ing of private property requiring compensation.' 55
Apparently, the court decided McElwain on the basis of the
legitimacy of the regulation because the multi-factor balancing
test, applied by the court in previous cases, received little atten-
tion. The regulation's economic impact and interference with Mrs.
McElwain's investment-backed expectations were substantial. She
purchased the property intending to build a house for her retire-
ment. Her property was not subject to regulations at the time of
purchase. The district court found that the highest and best use of
her property was for residential purposes. She suffered a 66.6 per-
cent diminution in value. 56 Mrs. McElwain had agreed to move
148. Id. at 237, 811 P.2d at 1271.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 240, 811 P.2d at 1273 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60. This test is actually an intermediate
level test. See supra text accompanying note 48.
153. McElwain, 248 Mont. at 234, 811 P.2d at 1269.
154. Id. at 236-37, 811 P.2d at 1271.
155. Id.; see, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982).
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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her house much further back from .the river if the county would be
willing to grant a twenty-foot variance. 157 Admittedly, the regula-
tion may have resulted in greater benefits to the public; however,
only Mrs. McElwain suffered the loss.
These cases demonstrate the haphazard application of the cur-
rent takings analysis. The application of definitive standards or
guidelines would prevent the type of debate engaged in by the
Montana Supreme Court in McElwain over the proper standard.
Courts seem to arbitrarily decide when to demand substantial,
minimal, or no justification for a regulation, when to defer to regu-
latory agencies, when to look at economic impact, and when to ap-
ply a balancing test. Although the fact-intensive nature of takings
cases will always require some "ad-hoc" analysis, the lack of con-
sistent guidelines results in severely disparate treatment.
IV. DEVELOPING AND APPLYING A DEFINITIVE TAKINGS STANDARD
A well-defined takings standard should answer three ques-
tions. Case law and considerations of constitutional review form
the basis of all three questions as well as delineating the tests used
in answering the questions. This section explores each in turn.
A. Does the Regulation Substantially Advance a Legitimate
State Interest Through the Least Restrictive Means
Necessary?58
This question is answered by applying an intermediate level
test and requiring the government to bear the burden of proof. '59
If the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest, then the regulation should be declared invalid and no tak-
ings issue exists. If the court determines that the regulation accom-
plishes its stated purpose through the least restrictive means nec-
essary, then the court should proceed to the second question.
157. See supra text accompanying note 140.
158. This question derives, in part, from Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
The question is actually a hybridization of the intermediate level (substantial relation) and
the high level (compelling government interest through least restrictive means) standards of
constitutional review. See supra text accompanying note 48. Property rights, as fundamen-
tal rights, should be reviewed only under the highest standard. However, that test would
depart significantly from case law, and the author is advocating a stricter standard, while
attempting to build on existing case law and history.
159. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1987). In Nollan,
the Court employed this intermediate level of review.
1994] 267
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B. Does the Regulation Deny an Owner All Economically
Viable Use?160
The answer to this question lies in the interpretation of "all
economical use." For the sake of simplification, assume that "all"
means ninety percent or more161 and "economical use" means the
use which an owner currently makes of property or the purpose for
which the owner purchased the property."6 2 If a court determines
that the regulation deprives the property owner of all economic
value, then compensation must be paid. If the economic depriva-
tion is less than total, as it will be in most cases, then the court
should proceed to the third question.
C. To What Degree Does the Regulation Interfere with the
Property Owner's Use or Interest?e3
This question is the most difficult to assess, and if the recent
United Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council' bears any weight, a series of questions are de-
rived from this third inquiry. What is the property right impaired?
Does state law afford particular protection to that property right?
To what extent is the relevant property right burdened by existing
common law? Once these issues are determined, courts must apply
the balancing factors set out in Penn Central.'65 As discussed in
Part V, Montana and other states with constitutional language set-
ting forth an "or damaged" requirement could greatly simplify this
question by relying on their particular constitutional provisions.
Some commentators believe the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions indicate a trend toward greater recognition of pri-
vate property rights and a return to more traditional takings anal-
ysis. '6 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council lends credence to
this view, but also elicits a great deal of criticism. 67 Because of the
160. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
161. The author chose 90 percent because cases discussing "all economic use" diminu-
tion generally require 90 percent or greater.
162. The notion of economical use is hotly debated. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
note 186. However, this author disputes that reasoning. "Economical use" cannot mean any
use that the property is susceptible of, because such a definition would imply that a taking
never occurs.
163. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
164. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
165. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
166. See Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy", 44 ARK. L. REV. 65
(1991); James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Crit-
ters-Is it Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992).
167. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 132; Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v.
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importance Lucas may have in takings analysis, the case is set
forth in some detail.
1. Background and Holding of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council
In 1986 developer David Lucas bought two residential lots on
the Isle of Palms in South Carolina.1 8 At that time, neither of his
lots were in a so-called "critical area," which meant he did not
have to obtain a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council
(SCCC).6 9 However, in 1988 the South Carolina Legislature en-
acted the Beachfront Management Act (Act) which expanded the
critical area, thereby prohibiting the construction of any habitable
improvements on Lucas's lots.'70 Lucas brought suit for inverse
condemnation, seeking compensation for the taking of his
property. 7 1
Lucas did not take issue with the Act's validity, but contended
that the Act's extinguishment of his property's value entitled him
to compensation.1 72 The trial court, in awarding Lucas $1.2 million,
stated that "at the time Lucas purchased the two lots, both were
zoned for single-family residential construction and ... there were
no restrictions imposed upon such use of the property.' 73
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding disposi-
tive Lucas's failure to contest the validity of the Act.' 74 The court
held that regardless of the effect on property's value, regulations
designed to prevent serious public harm do not require compensa-
tion under the federal Takings Clause.' 75 The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said that regulations
South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415
(1993). But see Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411 (1993); William W. Fischer III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1993).
168. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2890.
172. Id. Lucas argued that the question of justification or validity was not important
because the net effect was to take all economic use of his land. Id. However, such an argu-
ment would not hold up if his land were taken under a common law nuisance theory. Thus,
one can make the argument that Lucas is entitled to compensation for total taking and
would be equally justified in seeking compensation for a partial taking because the State
produced no evidence to demonstrate that the prohibition on development of his two lots
served an anti-nuisance justification. Amicus Curiae Brief of Institute for Justice at 23, Lu-
cas (No. 91-453).
173. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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which require land to be left predominantly in its natural state
"carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of miti-
gating serious public harm. ' 176 Addressing the merits of Lucas's
claim, the Court stated that at least two categories of regulatory
action were compensable without the usual inquiry into the public
interest. The categories are regulations that cause a physical inva-
sion of property or deny an owner all economically beneficial or
productive use of the owner's land.1 7
Dispensing with the "noxious use" theory that governed tak-
ings analysis during the heyday of substantive due process," 8 the
majority stressed that the distinction between a regulation which
prevents harm and one that secures a benefit is "in the eye of the
beholder. ' 17 9 Because a harm/benefit determination cannot be
made on a value-free basis, "the legislature's recitation of a nox-
ious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated."180
The Court indicated that a balancing of the loss to the owner
and the benefit to the community must occur. Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that in the case of land, the idea that property
rights are subject to an implied limitation that the state, through
regulation, may eliminate economically viable use of one's land is
inconsistent with the interpretation of the Takings Clause and his-
torical intent.181
Although remanding the case to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, the majority said that the state can avoid compensation
176. Id. at 2894-95.
177. Id. at 2893. The Court reiterated its takings analysis and said that "[t]he Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.'" Id. at 2893-94
(citation omitted). The Court then admitted that "the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of
all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision," resulting in inconsistent
holdings. Id. at 2894 n.7.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
179. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
180. Id. at 2899. The majority briefly discussed Justice Blackmun's dissent that the
test for compensation is whether there is a harm-preventing justification. "Since such a jus-
tification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the
legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than
insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations." Id. at 2898 n.12.
181. Id. at 2900 n.15. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, argues that the Framers did not
intend the Takings Clause to address regulatory actions or economic values. Id. at 2915 n.23.
While perhaps correct in his views, the Framers of the Constitution likely did not see the
tremendous potential for conflict. Furthermore, history clearly indicates the role private
property has played in shaping this nation. See Simms, supra note 16.
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only if inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the
proscribed use was never a part of Lucas's title.182 The regulation
must do no more than what it could have done under the common
law and the background principles of nuisance and property law.1 83
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in vigorous dissents,
questioned the majority's newly enunciated rule that the govern-
ment's power to act without paying compensation is based on
whether the prohibited activity is a common-law nuisance.' 84 Fur-
ther, Justice Blackmun cited Lucas's failure to contest the legisla-
tive finding of serious public harm and protested the majority's as-
sertion that "the State must do more than merely proffer its
legislative judgments to avoid invalidating its law."'8 5 Justice
Blackmun also took exception to the trial court's ruling that peti-
tioner has lost all economic value of his property:
This finding is almost certainly erroneous. Petitioner can still en-
joy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude
others .... Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on
the property in a movable trailer. State courts frequently have
recognized that land has economic value where the only residual
economic uses are recreation or camping. s8
Finally, Justice Blackmun questioned the "historical compact" no-
tion supported by the majority by restating the narrow interpreta-
tion of the Takings Clause as protecting possession only and not
value. 1
8 7
2. The Impact of Lucas
Whether Lucas actually represents a turning point in takings
jurisprudence is debatable. Commentators have described the deci-
sion as "anticlimactic" and "promising more than it delivers."'8 8
182. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2912-13, 2920-21 (Blackmun, J. & Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2909. Justice Blackmun's concern is the elimination of the presumption of
validity given to legislative enactments and the shifting of the burden of proof. Id.
186. Id. at 2908. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-3, at
593 (2d ed. 1988). "[F]orcing someone to stop doing things with his property-telling him
'you can keep it but you can't use it'-is at times indistinguishable, in ordinary terms, from
grabbing it and handing it over to someone else." Id.
187. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2915 (citing Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nine-
teenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Tak-
ings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 76 (1986)). See supra text accompanying
notes 16 and 181 for more discussion on the debate over the interpretation and historical
meaning of the takings clause.
188. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 167. In fact,
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Nevertheless, the decision in Lucas has two potentially significant
impacts.
The first impact arises from Justice Scalia's discussion of regu-
lations which require land to be left predominantly in its natural
state as "carry[ing] with them a heightened risk that private prop-
erty is being pressed into some form of public service under the
guise of mitigating serious public harm."'"" This language effec-
tively curbs environmental regulation, not regulation directed at
pollution and other industrial environmental concerns, but regula-
tion requiring property owners to leave property in a natural
state. 190 Undoubtedly, Lucas will provide fodder for the debate
over which view of property should prevail: historically bounded
traditional views of property or the ecological view of property.'
The second potential impact of Lucas is the court's stated concern
with nuisance law to define property rights. 9 '
The Court also struggled with the issue of what percent depri-
vation is necessary to create a compensable taking, but avoided the
more important inquiry: Why create separate standards for partial
and total takings? Is a regulation any less a taking when it affects
only one tract of land, when it impacts only the severed estate, or
when it results in a fifty-percent deprivation instead of ninety-per-
cent? A taking still occurs, and when the taking occurs in the ad-
vancement of a legitimate state interest, to benefit the public, what
rationale compels the landowner to bear the burden? Rather, the
benefited party should pay compensation when a regulation effects
a taking. Lucas did not answer many of the questions surrounding
takings law, but Lucas did reinforce the United States Supreme
Court's movement toward a stricter interpretation of takings law
in the areas of land use and zoning, Lucas may narrow the protection afforded property
owners if courts interpret the decision as the Montana Supreme Court did in its most recent
takings case. See Kudloff v. City of Billings, - Mont. -, -, 860 P.2d 140, 142-43
(1993) (holding that the annexation'of Kudloff's property was not an unconstitutional tak-
ing because "[i]t is only when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial use of that property in the name of the common good that a consti-
tutionally-protected takings has occurred") (citing Lucas). Although the facts of this case
never set forth a good takings issue, the Montana Supreme Court misinterprets Lucas. One
can only hope that the decision leaves room for a broader interpretation of Lucas.
189. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
190. In fact, this effect can be seen in recent United States Claims Court decisions
regarding wetlands and 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (providing for dredging and filling permits).
191. Although the author is an adamant supporter of traditional and constitutional
views of property, for an opposing view, see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Econ-
omy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433 (1993).
192. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2901. A thorough discussion of the development and
problems associated with nuisance law is beyond the scope of this article.
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and the protection of private property. Unfortunately, without spe-
cific takings guidelines, further litigation will have to provide the
answers.
While Lucas only addressed those situations in which the
property owner suffered loss of all economically viable use, the
Court explicitly recognized the role states play in determining
when a taking requires compensation. 193 Commentators Richard
Epstein and James Huffman advocate an elimination of the dis-
tinction between partial and total takings.1 94 While the United
States Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt their views, states can
move, and arguably are moving, in that direction. '95
The previous sections of this Comment discussed the histori-
cal background and court interpretations of the Takings Clauses
which are the underpinnings of constitutional jurisprudence. State
law and legislative efforts can supplement these underpinnings by
clarifying takings guidelines.
V. TOWARD A DEFINITIVE STANDARD IN MONTANA
Four rationales exist for arguing that states, and specifically
Montana, should adopt stricter guidelines in formulating a takings
standard: (1) a "new federalism" movement, (2) the "or damaged"
language of the Montana Takings Clause, (3) the "adequate and
independent state grounds" doctrine, and (4) legislation. The first
three rationales are interrelated and interdependent.
A. New Federalism
Since 1977 much has been written advocating the development
of state constitutional law.196 Courts, historically, have been incon-
sistent when addressing the conflict between police powers and
property rights. Until the late 1800's federal courts were primarily
responsible for the protection of individual rights. For the next
half-century, states' police powers often prevailed over individual
rights.1 97 Since the 1950's the federal courts have returned to a
more protective view of individual rights, but often to the exclu-
sion of contract and property rights. In recent years, however, state
193. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
194. See Huffman, supra note 132; EPSTEIN, supra note 15.
195. See infra text accompanying note 213-15.
196. See generally Tinkle, supra note 8; Ronald K. Collins, Foreward: Reliance on
State Constitutions-Beyond the "New Federalism," 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (1984);
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
197. See Brennan, supra note 196, at 502-04.
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courts have increasingly relied on state constitutional provisions to
increase the protection of individuals beyond the level of protec-
tion afforded by the federal constitution. This expanded protection
encompasses a broad range of individual rights, including privacy,
freedom of expression, and search and seizure laws.19s
The Montana Supreme Court also has relied on state constitu-
tional provisions in giving greater protection to individuals than-
provided by the federal constitution.19 Considering Montana's
unique constitutional provisions, however, the Montana Supreme
Court seldom has exercised the opportunity to provide greater in-
dividual protections. Thus far, the new federalism movement infre-
quently has encompassed property rights in this enhanced protec-
tion.2 °0 However, the Montana Supreme Court has specifically
relied on Montana's Takings Clause in Less v. City of Butte2 01 and
Knight v. City of Billings.2  Other states have afforded greater
protection to private property when tied to due process con-
cerns.20 3 Generally, the new federalism movement depends on a
state constitutional provision that differs from the federal provi-
sion by providing enhanced protection to the right at issue. Argua-
bly, this movement could extend to a state constitutional provision
that parallels the federal provision, because the state court's inter-
pretation of its own language is not bound by federal
interpretation.
B. Montana Constitution, Article Two, Section 29
Arguably, Montana's constitution affords more protection to
the rights of private property owners because of the "or damaging"
language in Article II, Section 29.204 In fact, as previously dis-
cussed, the Montana Supreme Court made this argument in Less
v. City of Butte and Knight v. City of Billings. Seventeen states
have "or damaging" language in their corresponding state constitu-
198. A number of commentators have written on the new federalism movement. See,
e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1147 (1993); Foster A. Stewart, Jr., Comment, The Role of New Federalism in Penn-
sylvania: Does United States Supreme Court Precedent Have Any Weight?, 30 DuQ. L.
REV. 707 (1992).
199. See State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 512-14, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-55 (1986) (re-
fusing to "march lock-step" with the United States Supreme Court on constitutional issues).
200. But see United Artist Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6
(Pa. 1991) (significantly increasing the rights of individuals under Pennsylvania's Takings
Clause).
201. 28 Mont. 27, 31-32, 72 P. 140, 141 (1903).
202. 197 Mont. 165, 172-73, 642 P.2d 141, 144-45 (1982).
203. See Tinkle, supra note 8.
204. See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
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tional provisions.20 5 The doctrine allowing a state court to premise
its decision on the state constitutional provision instead of the fed-
eral provision is known as "adequate and independent state
grounds."
C. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
The federal constitution sets a required minimum level of pro-
tection for individual rights below which state courts cannot fall.
Under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, state
constitutions may provide expanded protection to individual
rights. An adequate state ground is itself constitutionally permissi-
ble.20 6 The Montana constitutional provision is adequate because,
arguably, Article II, Section 29 is more protective of property
rights than the corresponding provision in the United States Con-
stitution. 07 An independent state ground is one that does not de-
pend on federal standards for the result. 0 8 Rather, the decision
must rely on the expanded state right.'0 9 Thus, the Montana con-
stitutional provision is independent if the justification for an
award of compensation is based on the "or damaging" language.
Although the Montana courts rarely invoke this language, one
could argue that the independent and adequate state grounds doc-
trine allows Montana to develop its own takings law with the "or
damaged" language as a fundamental tenet. This language pro-
vides an adequate and independent state ground to allow Montana
to develop its own takings law, free from federal oversight, as long
as it protects the minimum rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
The assertion of the "or damaging" language as an adequate
and independent state ground has two results. First, it eliminates
some of the distinction between partial and total takings because
"or damaging" encompasses partial interferences with the use of
property. Second, it allows Montana to develop more definitive
takings guidelines based on the state's view of property rights.
205. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
206. See TRIBE, supra note 186, § 3-24, at 164 n.12.
207. Compare the text of U.S. CONST. amend. V with the text of MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 29. In fact, some commentators argue that adequate and independent state grounds exist
even if the state constitutional language parallels the federal constitution. See Larry M.
Elison and Dennis Natlik Simmons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doc-
trine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV. 178 (1984).
208. TRIBE, supra note 186.
209. TRIBE, supra note 186.
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D. Legislation
Legislation adopting the rational basis and multi-factor tests
may serve to alleviate unnecessary litigation, but the legislation's
primary purpose is to set forth concisely a standard of review in
the conflict between property owners' rights and state police pow-
ers. Because state and federal takings laws have been ad hoc and
inconsistent, various interest groups and state legislators have en-
couraged and sponsored new legislation. 210 Landmark 1987 United
States Supreme Court decisions 211 triggered much debate on the
takings issue. That debate has manifested itself in a number of
efforts to control and protect property rights.21 2
As population grows, environmental, zoning, and land-use con-
cerns increasingly conflict with the rights of private property own-
ership. Most takings cases arise from these conflicts. States must
take an active role in balancing these concerns and agendas, thus
clarifying a takings standard. With these considerations in mind,
twenty-seven states introduced property rights bills in 1992.213 Al-
though only four states succeeded in passing those bills,21 states
have introduced fourteen versions of property rights bills in
1993.21' Two additional examples of efforts to codify property
rights protection are a 1988 Executive Order signed by President
Reagan 2" and House Bill 570, a bill proposed in Montana's 1993
legislative session.2 "7 House Bill 570 was tabled by a 25-25 vote in
the Senate.
210. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988). See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
211. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
212. See Williams, supra note 5, at 11 (citing Ann Corcoran, publisher of the Land
Rights Letter, who lists 54 property rights groups in her 1992 directory).
213. See Williams, supra note 5, at 12.
214. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-2-221 to -223 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 605 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-1 to -4 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 36-70A-370
(1993).
215. See, e.g., A.B. 145, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); A.B. 2328, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1993); H.B. 1194, 59th Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1993); S.B. 133, 59th Colo. Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (1993); H.B. 1437, 13th Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); H.B. 322, 52d Idaho
Leg., 1st Sess. (1993); S.B. 1212, 178th Mass. Gen Ct., Reg. Sess. (1993); H.B. 174, 87th Mo.
Leg., 1st Sess. (1993); S.B. 125, S.C. Leg, Statewide Sess. (1993); H.B. 485, 73d Tex. Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (1993); S.B. 1226, 73d Tex. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); H.B. 171, Utah Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1993).
216. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
217. H.B. 570, 53d Mont. Leg. (1993).
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1. The Foundation of Takings Legislation-Executive Order No.
12,630
Current legislative efforts arise from a 1988 Executive Order,
signed by President Reagan, entitled "Governmental Actions and
Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights. 2 18
The order requires the executive branch to determine, before the
enactment of a proposed agency regulation, if the regulation
presents a Fifth Amendment takings threat.219 The order applies
to most restrictions on private property and specifically requires a
Takings Implication Analysis (TIA) when an agency regulation fo-
cuses on public health and safety issues. The TIA must: (1) iden-
tify,' as specifically as possible, the public health and safety risk
that the proposed property use creates;220 (2) establish that the
proposed government action "substantially advances the purpose
of protecting public health and safety" against the specifically
identified risk;22' (3) establish that the proposed restrictions are
not disproportionate to the landowner's contribution to the overall
risk;222 and (4) "estimate the potential cost to the government in
the event that a court later determines that the action constituted
a taking. ' 223 A comparison of these factors with the rational basis
and multi-factor balancing test indicates how future legislation
may codify the United States Supreme Court rational basis and
multi-factor tests set forth in Nollan224 and Penn Central.225
2. Recent Montana Legislation
Continuing the precedent set forth in the Reagan Executive
Order, a bill introduced in the 1993 Montana legislative session
proposed to further strengthen property owners' rights and to cod-
ify holdings in recent takings decisions. 22e The proposed "Montana
218. Exec. Order No. 12,630. Many commentators have maligned the Executive Order;
however, a surprising number of states have considered its language in proposing property
rights bills. See supra notes 214-15.
219. See Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, The New "Takings" Executive Or-
der and Environmental Regulations-Collision or Cooperation?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,254
(1988).
220. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 4(d)(1).
221. See supra note 216, § 4(d)(2).
222. See supra note 216, § 4(d)(3).
223. See supra note 216, § 4(d)(4).
224. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
225. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
226. H.B. 570, 53d Mont. Leg. (1993). This bill was tabled by a 25-25 vote in the
senate. Telephone Interview with Lorna Frank, Director of Legislative Affairs for Montana
Farm Bureau Federation (Dec. 8, 1993).
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Private Property Assessment Act, 227 modeled after Executive Or-
der 12,630, incorporated the tests and language of Nollan and
Penn Central. The stated purposes of House Bill 570 were to "re-
quire the assessment of governmental actions that affect the use
and value of private property, to require an assessment of the ef-
fect of governmental actions on constitutionally protected private
property interests, and to avoid unnecessary burdens on the public
treasury. "228
Montana, historically, has been more likely to award compen-
sation for the taking of private property than many jurisdictions,229
but Montana's citizens should take a more active role in shaping
takings law. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
underscored the need for states to take an active role in determin-
ing the balance between property rights and governmental regula-
tions. The United States Supreme Court in Lucas recognized the
role states will play in determining what constitutes a deprivation
of property significant enough to warrant compensation:
The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of
property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular inter-
est in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value. 230
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of definitive guidelines in the takings debate ensures
that conflicts between regulations and property rights will result in
an enormous increase in litigation.2"' Property rights, especially
the right of use, naturally conflict with regulation.2 32 The develop-
227. H.B. 570, at 1.
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. See, e.g., Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982); City of
Three Forks v. Montana State Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 480 P.2d 826 (1971); Less
v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903).
230. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). The
Court goes on to say that this issue is not discussed in the case "because Lucas' interest in
land, fee simple, is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law." Id.
231. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
232. One commentator views the police power as a private right:
[I]n the state of nature, that is, individuals do have rights of self-enforcement;
hence, in theory, at least, these rights might have been yielded up to the state to
be exercised by the state on behalf of its members. (Thus do governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed.) ...
... But it also provides an insight into its legitimate scope and hence into the
taking issue itself. For if the police power has its origins in the enforcement rights
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ment of a standard based on case law, Montana's Takings Clause,
adequate and independent state grounds, and legislation can re-
solve, in part, these inherent conflicts. Sound takings principles do
not jeopardize valid police power regulation. If the means used to
implement a regulation substantially advance a legitimate state in-
terest through the least restrictive means necessary, then the regu-
lation still will be upheld. When that regulation imposes a dispro-
portionate burden on the landowner and significantly impairs the
landowner's use of or economic value in the land, the government
entity should compensate the landowner. In the words of Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private prop-
erty disappears.
... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achiev-
ing the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of pay-
ing for the change. '33
The historic import of property rights and the constitutional
purpose of the Takings Clause have little value without clear
guidelines upon which both government and property owners can
rely. Guidelines based on historical intent, case law, Montana's
Takings Clause, and legislation provide one method of departure
from the courts' essentially "ad hoc" takings analyses and inconsis-
tent constructions of the Takings Clauses.
of the individual, then that power, if it is to be exercised legitimately, can be no
more broad than those original rights.
Roger Pilon, Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Society, 6 HARV. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 165,
186-87 (1983).
233. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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